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Georgia Positions Itself on China’s 
New Silk Road 
Relations between Tbilisi and Beijing in the Light of the Belt-and-Road Initiative 
Franziska Smolnik 
China’s importance and presence in Georgia are growing. The Belt and Road Initiative, 
Beijing’s vision of a new Silk Road, has met with active approval here – in contrast to 
a number of West European capitals, where the project is instead increasingly viewed 
with reservations or scepticism. The government in Tbilisi is carefully positioning 
Georgia as an essential part of the south Eurasian corridor. In order to profit from 
future trade flow between China and Europe, it has implemented a series of measures. 
In 2017, it became the first country in Eurasia to conclude a free-trade agreement with 
China. Large infrastructure projects are being carried out to facilitate transit. Georgia 
is also using formats such as the Tbilisi Belt & Road Forum to promote its location. 
However, whether the new Silk Road will be a purely win-win situation for the country, 
still remains to be seen. 
 
In autumn 2013 the Chinese government 
announced its concept of a new Silk Road, 
which now operates under the designation 
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It in-
tends to build and/or expand a multi-layered 
network of sea and overland routes in the 
coming years and decades, along which 
regional and supra-regional cooperation 
can prosper. The Initiative is less a fully 
worked-out foreign-policy plan, more a 
framework or superstructure. It also sub-
sumes existing traffic routes and infra-
structure plans. Despite its rather hazy 
outline – or perhaps because of it – the BRI 
seems to be successful in inspiring visions 
for the future in the southern Caucasus. 
The BRI and National 
Development Strategies 
Georgia’s leadership sees China’s initiative 
as confirmation of its own foreign-policy 
goal of establishing the country as a trans-
port hub between Europe and Asia. It 
expects improved regional connectivity to 
lead to both increased transit and a marked 
upturn in its domestic economy. According 
to the government’s discourse, it is above 
all Georgia’s strategically important geo-
graphical location that predestines it as a 
hub: not only do its Black Sea ports offer 
Central Asia’s landlocked countries access 
to European markets, but for China and 
the EU the route via Georgia complements 
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northern Eurasian overland routes through 
Russia. The government in Tbilisi also fore-
grounds the country’s political order, point-
ing to its democratic reforms and high level 
of economic liberalisation. It has sought to 
put itself on the map as an attractive busi-
ness location through such events as the 
Tbilisi Belt & Road Forum, which was organ-
ised with Chinese partners in 2017 for the 
second time and is meant to be a “mini 
Davos”. Associating its own development 
strategies with the “BRI” label is also in-
tended to boost Georgia’s image abroad. 
To establish itself as a hub linking East 
and West, Georgia is primarily banking on 
two series of measures: creating a network 
of free-trade agreements, most recently 
through the agreement with China; and 
expanding infrastructure, in particular 
through the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway 
route and the deep-sea port at Anaklia. 
However, these measures will only take 
full effect in several years’ time. Whilst this 
is in keeping with expectations in Georgia, 
it does make it difficult to gauge their suc-
cess (or otherwise). This is reflected in the 
ambivalence characterising the debate in 
Georgia, as the author discovered in 
conversations in Tbilisi. 
Economic and Political Objectives 
In Tbilisi, close relations with China are 
seen as an essential factor for increasing 
trade flow along the southern Eurasian 
route and helping to realise the goal of 
Georgia becoming a transport hub. Geor-
gia’s vision is to act as a bridge between 
East and West. In this context, Georgia-
China relations do not rival but comple-
ment the country’s Euro-Atlantic orienta-
tion and its ongoing integration into Euro-
pean structures. 
The Georgian leadership primarily views 
expanded relations with China in terms of 
economic gains. However, it also hopes for 
an important synergy effect of economic 
cooperation and increased economic inter-
ests, namely security guarantees and a 
counterweight to its neighbour to the north, 
Russia. Extensive Chinese economic inter-
ests in Georgia should prevent Russia from 
using military aggression against the coun-
try – at least that is the idea – since Moscow 
will take care not to endanger Chinese in-
vestments. According to local observers, 
Georgia’s cooperation with China also sends 
a crucial message to Moscow that alter-
native markets exist – and that potential 
export losses from renewed Russian sanc-
tions against Georgian products could 
easily be recouped. 
The Development of Bilateral 
Economic Relations to Date 
Economic cooperation between Georgia 
and China has developed rapidly in the past 
few years. There are ever more meetings 
between Chinese entrepreneurs and Geor-
gian government officials and business 
representatives with the aim of further ex-
panding relations. In the 1990s, the two 
countries’ trading volume was negligible. 
According to Georgia’s statistical agency, 
until 2000 annual imports from China came 
to under US$3 million; Georgian exports to 
China did not even reach US$1 million. This 
changed dramatically in the first decade 
of the new century, when trading volumes 
rose more than a hundredfold. This increase 
was primarily driven by the enormous 
growth in Chinese exports and under-
pinned by China’s changed foreign policy, 
proclaimed by Beijing in the early 2000s 
under the motto “Going Out”. During the 
late 2000s, several larger commissions for 
infrastructure development in Georgia, 
such as bypasses, tunnels and railway lines, 
went to Chinese companies. Trade between 
the countries continued to increase sharply 
in the following years. In 2017 Georgian 
exports to China amounted to over US$207 
million; imports from China to Georgia 
were valued at over US$732 million. 
However, these figures reveal not only 
the strong growth in bilateral trade rela-
tions. They also highlight a trade deficit 
on the part of Georgia, which, with its not 
even 4 million inhabitants, is a tiny country 
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compared to China. There is also an imbal-
ance in the range of traded goods. Whilst 
China sells a range of goods to Georgia, 
the latter’s exports to China are not very 
diversified. Ores, copper and copper prod-
ucts predominate alongside alcoholic 
drinks, especially wine. In contrast to the 
wide portfolio of exported goods from 
China, little diversification exists in Chi-
nese foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Georgia. One company in particular, the 
Hualing Group, looms large – inter alia as 
operator of a duty-free industrial zone in 
Georgia’s Kutaisi. The Hualing Group’s in-
vestments pushed China’s FDI to its peak 
of nearly US$218 million in 2014. How-
ever, the dominance of a single investment 
source carries with it a risk of fluctuation. 
Thus, in 2016 China’s direct investments 
were only about US$26 million. In 2017, 
FDI increased again, though far below 2014 
levels. 
Free Trade with China from 2018 
This is the backdrop against which Geor-
gia’s leadership judges its free-trade agree-
ment with China, which entered into effect 
on 1 January 2018, to be a real success. The 
agreement is seen as paving the way for 
further development of economic relations 
and Georgia’s future as a hub between East 
and West. Import duties have been removed 
on both sides for over 90 percent of export 
categories. The government in Tbilisi 
assumes that Georgia in particular will 
profit from the agreement since most im-
ports from China were already exempted 
from customs duties before the agreement, 
a sign of the liberalisation of Georgia’s 
economy. A feasibility study carried out in 
the run-up to the negotiations came to a 
similar conclusion. For instance, the agree-
ment stipulates that China will remove 
customs duties from alcoholic drinks, in-
cluding wine. Previously these were as high 
as 20 percent for Georgian wines. Tbilisi 
therefore expects this export hit to further 
establish itself on the Chinese market. 
China is already the second-biggest market 
for wine from Georgia, after Russia – al-
though the total volume of bottles sold 
to Russia is still about six times greater. 
The agreement was negotiated relatively 
quickly. Its advocates see this as proof of 
Beijing’s interest in Georgia. However, scep-
tics – including many representatives of 
Georgia’s business world – feel the hasty 
agreement reflects the asymmetry between 
the two economies and inadequately pro-
tects Georgia’s own market against China’s 
economic might and its affordable prod-
ucts. They have numerous unanswered 
questions, in particular how domestic 
production and the local workforce might 
profit from the agreement. One challenge 
for Georgia’s economy is the frequently low 
competitiveness of local products. Despite 
positive dynamics, its industrial sector 
is neither well-developed nor productive. 
Georgia’s stumbling block, however, con-
tinues to be its agricultural sector. The 
national development strategy “Georgia 
2020” concedes that the country’s export 
potential is generally low. For sceptics, 
these conditions will make it challenging 
to diversify the country’s exports and there-
fore difficult to make extensive use of the 
customs exemption on Georgia’s side. 
Furthermore, the growth of promising and 
export-orientated sectors of the economy 
often founders due to a lack of qualified 
labour in the country. 
The Free-Trade Network as a 
Competitive Advantage 
The free-trade agreement with China com-
pletes a whole series of comparable agree-
ments concluded by Tbilisi. Georgia also 
has free-trade agreements with the CIS 
countries Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Ka-
zakhstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan; its neighbours Armenia, Azer-
baijan and Turkey; the EFTA states Switzer-
land, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway; 
and, via the Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA), the EU member states. 
It also enjoys preferential trade rules within 
its relations with the USA, Canada and 
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Japan; negotiations for a free-trade agree-
ment with India are planned. 
This network of customs-exempt trade 
has enabled Georgia to grow its own mar-
ket exponentially, according to Georgian 
government officials. They point out that, 
with existing free-trade agreements alone, 
the country can offer Chinese companies 
access to a market of more than 800 million 
people. This, they believe, is one of its fun-
damental advantages as a business location 
in the competition not only for transit 
flows from East to West but also for attract-
ing Chinese companies to transfer produc-
tion to Georgia. However, a precondition 
for using Georgia as an export platform for 
the EU market is that it fulfils or imple-
ments the DCFTA requirements on rules 
of origin as well as product-safety, hygiene 
and social standards. To date, Chinese in-
vestment focuses mostly on non-tradable 
goods, and investment in Georgia’s export-
orientated sectors is extremely low, accord-
ing to two studies made in 2017 by the 
Georgian Foundation for Strategic and In-
ternational Studies. 
Expanding Infrastructure 
Alongside its free-trade extension, the Geor-
gian government is also making efforts to 
expand the country’s road, rail and sea 
traffic infrastructure. Its aim is to markedly 
increase the attractiveness of both Georgia’s 
location and the route from China to Europe 
through the southern Caucasus. 
Currently, the southern route is still 
overshadowed by the northern routes via 
Russia, which handle the large majority of 
overland (rail) transit between China and 
Europe. Two infrastructure projects in par-
ticular now aim to change that: the new, or 
rather modernised, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) 
rail link connecting the neighbouring coun-
tries of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey; 
and the mega project at Anaklia, a deep-sea 
port on Georgia’s Black Sea Coast, estimat-
ed to cost US$2.5 bn. 
Rail Traffic: Baku–Tbilisi–Kars 
Although the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars rail link 
was conceived, and work begun, long 
before BRI, it is now seen in Georgia as a 
central component of the southern Eura-
sian route. After a decade of construction 
and several delays, the physical infrastruc-
ture has been completed. On 30 October 
2017, the line was inaugurated in Baku by 
the heads of state or government of Azer-
baijan, Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. Once the railroad has become 
fully operational, it is expected to be able to 
carry up to 17 million tonnes of freight and 
three million passengers annually. Current-
ly, its capacity is still substantially below 
those levels, at around five million tonnes 
of freight and one million passengers. The 
first test run was carried out as long ago as 
December 2015 from Lianyungang, a town 
in northeast China, via Kazakhstan, the 
Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and Georgia to 
Turkey – with the last leg again by ship 
from the Georgian port of Poti, rather than 
by train. The journey time of 15 days be-
came the benchmark for those involved; in 
Georgia this figure was also used to herald 
its arrival as a competitor to the northern 
routes via Russia. 
Despite the importance accorded to the 
BTK route for the southern Eurasian cor-
ridor by the initiating countries, no Chi-
nese, European or international investors 
participated in its financing. From early 
on, actors such as the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank or the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
favoured a connection that included 
Armenia. Due to the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh, however, this was not an option 
for Azerbaijan or Turkey – the two coun-
tries’ borders with Armenia are closed. The 
BTK railroad was therefore sponsored by 
Turkey and Azerbaijan. The latter co-financed 
the Georgian section of the link through 
two loans from the state energy company, 
totalling approximately US$775 million. It 
is likely that the government in Baku also 
secured itself some control over the terms 
of use for the Georgian section. It has al-
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ready announced that Armenia would only 
be allowed to use the BTK to transport its 
own freight if progress was made in the Na-
gorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Sea Traffic: Anaklia Deep-Sea Port 
Georgia plans to use the deep-sea port at 
Anaklia to decisively strengthen the mari-
time component of this southern route. 
The two Georgian Black Sea ports which 
currently handle most of the traffic are Poti 
and Batumi, further south. Their shortcom-
ing is insufficient depth for container ships 
of the Panamax class. Freight coming from 
or going to Georgia therefore has to be trans-
ferred to other ships in Istanbul or Constanta 
(Romania), leading to delays. The deep-sea 
port at Anaklia is meant to remedy this. 
Anaklia is viewed as a once-in-a-century 
project – “a new Georgia is being born”, ac-
cording to Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikash-
vili. Its construction in several phases is 
projected to take the next few decades. The 
first operational phase is expected to start 
in 2020 with a capacity of 900,000 TEU 
(standard containers) per year – more than 
half of what the port at Poti can currently 
process. 
China was initially not involved in this 
mega project, whose first phase of con-
struction began in December 2017. A Geor-
gian-Chinese consortium had submitted a 
bid to the government for building the 
deep-sea port, but the contract was ulti-
mately awarded to a Georgian-American 
joint venture, to the surprise of many. The 
leadership in Tbilisi sees this choice not 
least as a confirmation of the country’s 
Euro-Atlantic orientation and shared values 
with the West. As well as offering better 
terms, the Georgian-American concept dis-
tinguished itself by planning to employ as 
much Georgian labour as possible. This 
choice also reflects the scepticism of parts 
of Georgian society towards increasing 
Chinese commitments in the country. Many 
specialists and workers on infrastructure 
projects conducted by Chinese companies 
so far have come from China. This has been 
particularly true for projects not financed 
by the state and therefore less closely regu-
lated. Georgian financial analysts argue 
that Chinese companies draw on Chinese 
employees not least because of the shortage 
of skilled labour in Georgia. However, the 
wider public tends to be critical of growing 
labour migration from China; fears of for-
eign domination increasingly play a role in 
Georgia’s social discourse. 
Although the Georgian-American bid 
was awarded the contract for Anaklia, Chi-
nese commitment was welcomed from the 
outset to position the project within the BRI 
context. Since early 2018, the Chinese com-
pany Zhenhua Heavy Industries Co. (ZPMC) 
has been involved in the project, providing 
US$50 bn. It is also expected to find further 
source of investments for Anaklia in China. 
Challenges beyond the Physical 
Infrastructure 
Despite its optimism regarding opportuni-
ties for Chinese-Georgian cooperation, the 
leadership in Tbilisi is not solely banking 
on bilateral relations with Beijing. It is also 
making efforts to expand regional coopera-
tion, for instance as part of the BTK. Its rela-
tions with Azerbaijan and Turkey are al-
ready close. Georgia cooperates with these 
two countries mainly economically, but 
increasingly also in security and military 
matters. Recently, there have been attempts 
to resuscitate the GUAM Organisation for 
Democracy and Economic Development, 
whose members are Georgia, Ukraine, Azer-
baijan and Moldova. Last year, the organisa-
tion’s first high-level meeting since 2008 
was held under a Georgian presidency. It 
agreed to strengthen the economic aspects 
of cooperation. Georgia is also working with 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Tur-
key within the framework of the Trans-Cas-
pian International Transport Route (TITR). 
This multilateral approach makes sense. 
Transport experts believe that the southern 
Eurasian route suffers from a competitive 
disadvantage because it crosses so many 
countries. Another test run, also in 2015, 
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from Xinjiang in western China to the 
Georgian Black-Sea port of Poti only took 
nine days, but by all accounts almost a 
third of that time was lost to administrative 
hurdles. To make the southern corridor 
truly competitive, substantial adjustments 
will be required in terms of prices/fees, 
customs, operation, and work processes – 
for instance when changing means of trans-
port to cross the Caspian and Black Sea, in 
itself a weakness of that route compared 
to the entirely overland routes via Russia. 
Regulations in the countries involved must 
also be harmonised, which requires close 
cooperation of all stakeholders along the 
entire transport chain. Such is the conclu-
sion of a study commissioned by the Inter-
national Union of Railways, published in 
October 2017. 
Georgia has already successfully imple-
mented several reforms, for instance by 
introducing integrated border manage-
ment and making customs clearance more 
efficient. However, in Georgia as well “soft” 
infrastructure could still be improved. Its 
officials rightly assert that the country 
scores well in international governance 
and business rankings. However, where the 
preconditions for creating a transport hub 
are concerned, individual indicators can 
give a more nuanced picture. The latest 
Enabling Trade Index (2016), published by 
the World Economic Forum, ranks Georgia 
41st and thus the best in Eurasia. However, 
it slides further down the table in sub-
indices such as availability and quality of 
transport infrastructure, and availability 
and quality of transport services (76th and 
98th out of 136). In the Doing Business 
Ranking 2018 Georgia made the global top 
ten with an impressive ninth place, but in 
the Trading across Borders category it did 
less well, coming 62nd. Meanwhile, in the 
World Bank’s latest Logistics Performance 
Index (2016), Georgia only reaches 130th 
out of 160 – which puts it mid-table among 
comparable Eurasian countries. Given the 
interdependencies in the transit sector, uni-
lateral Georgian efforts to improve soft infra-
structure will not be enough, however. The 
efforts would have to be reciprocated and 
also met with the corresponding political 
willingness by the other countries along 
the route. 
Route Competition – 
Even within Georgia? 
The inclusiveness of the Belt and Road 
Initiative is often cited as one of its central 
characteristics. There are no fixed routes, 
only sketched-out corridors. On a much 
smaller scale, Georgia has a similarly web-
like structure. Improvements to the sea 
route via the Black Sea, the rail link to-
wards Turkey and the road network are 
meant to help the country benefit as much 
as possible from the flow of goods between 
China and Europe. However, analysts and 
those involved in expanding the transit 
route raise the question of whether the 
planned capacities will really be fully uti-
lised. The operator of the port at Poti, no 
doubt inter alia with an eye on future com-
petition from Anaklia, has announced an 
expansion of that port as well. A 2015 
World Bank report on Georgia’s transport 
and logistics strategy did acknowledge that 
the existing Georgian Black-Sea ports are 
operationally limited, but also stated that 
their capacities corresponded to both cur-
rent demand and the projected demand for 
the next few years. Moreover, the comple-
tion of the BTK rail link has also connected 
Turkey’s Mediterranean and Black-Sea ports 
to the southern Eurasian route via Georgia. 
These might also compete with Anaklia. In 
conversation, local and international ex-
perts point out that, at least for the moment, 
the growth rates on which planning for 
Anaklia was based have not been realised. 
On this point, the above-mentioned In-
ternational Union of Railways study stated 
that overland transport by rail between 
Asia and Europe was growing quickly and 
would continue to grow. Nonetheless, its 
share of total trade is expected to remain 
small compared to sea freight. Experts 
calculate that rail freight is around three 
times quicker than the sea route, but also 
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three to three-and-a-half times more expen-
sive. It is therefore best suited, they say, to 
high-cost goods where quick availability is 
a priority and additional costs are less im-
portant. Moreover, they say, the greater 
share of the goods will still travel on the 
northern routes via Russia. According to 
projections for 2027, only three percent 
of the Eurasian rail traffic will go on the 
southern routes, meaning both the line 
via Georgia and those via Central Asia, Iran 
and Turkey which circumvent Georgia. 
Analyses by the ISET Policy Institute in 
Tbilisi reveal that freight transport on 
Georgia’s railways has been declining in 
recent years, dropping from 22 or 23 mil-
lion tonnes in 2007-2008 to under 12 mil-
lion tonnes in 2016. The analyses found 
a reduction particularly in transit, even 
though a large share of it remained on the 
southern route and merely moved to roads. 
Some freight, however, also migrated to the 
northern routes. Figures from the Georgian 
Finance Ministry and the national statistics 
agency similarly show that freight has 
declined overall in recent years. 
Experts in Georgia largely welcome the 
government’s initiative to turn the country 
into a transport hub. However, some ques-
tion whether Georgia is not better suited to 
being a hub for regional trade between the 
states of the southern Caucasus and Central 
Asia than a hub for international trade be-
tween China and Europe. Many agree that 
Georgia will have to acquire noticeably 
more trade to realise its potential as a trans-
port junction, and not only trade from 
China or from East to West, but also in the 
opposite direction. Having the physical 
infrastructure is a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for this. 
To increase transit volumes, Georgia is 
also gambling on geopolitics. Russia’s on-
going embargo on certain European and 
Ukrainian food stuffs, as well as the con-
straints imposed on Ukrainian goods 
transit via Russia to China, could benefit 
the southern route. After all, China is an 
increasingly important buyer of Ukrainian 
agricultural products. And the fact that Chi-
na is eyeing Georgia’s ports in particular 
can be seen not just in Anaklia but Poti as 
well: in 2017, CEFC China Energy acquired 
75 percent of the tax-exempt industrial 
zone there. 
Conclusion and Outlook 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has hit a 
chord with the Georgian government. It 
is compatible with the government’s own 
attempts to establish Georgia as a transport 
hub and to capitalise on its geographical 
position between Europe and Asia. To make 
the country attractive as a regional and 
inter-regional hub, Tbilisi is counting in 
particular on a network of free-trade agree-
ments as well as the expansion and up-
grade of its infrastructure. The fact that, in 
2017, Georgia was one of the first countries 
ever to receive a credit from the Beijing-
initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (whose founding members include 
Georgia) is seen as proof, along with the 
free-trade agreement, of Georgia’s signifi-
cance for the Chinese. 
As a trade hub, Georgia wants to profit 
from more than just transit. It also intends 
to further boost its domestic economy. 
When the first building phase of the deep-
sea port at Anaklia was launched in Decem-
ber 2017, Prime Minister Kvirikashvili said 
the project would turn Georgia into a 
“logistics and industrial development hub”. 
As an export platform, Georgia wants to 
attract foreign companies that will relocate 
their production or processing facilities so 
as to benefit from the DCFTA with the Euro-
pean Union or the free-trade agreement 
with China for goods “made in Georgia”. 
Whether these plans will be realised re-
mains to be seen. Georgia certainly requires 
further measures to harmonise with Euro-
pean standards and regulations so as to 
profit comprehensively from the DCFTA. 
It will also need to make greater efforts to 
train skilled labour so as to strengthen the 
export-orientated sectors of its economy. 
Not least of all, Georgia’s very active 
integration into the Belt and Road context 
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shows the independent-mindedness of its 
foreign policy. While that policy continues 
to be primarily orientated towards the 
West, it is increasingly open towards the 
East. How far Georgia’s agency (both finan-
cial and political) will go given the huge 
asymmetry between China’s economy and 
its own is an open question. So far, the 
Georgian government has emphasised the 
economic importance of the new Silk Road 
and its associated Chinese commitments in 
the region. Georgia’s geopolitical consider-
ations mainly concern Russia – whether 
they be opportunities for fencing in its 
neighbour to the North by increasing Chi-
nese economic interests in Georgia, or 
positioning the southern Eurasian route 
as an alternative to the northern routes 
dominated by Moscow. 
Tbilisi stresses that its relations with the 
West and China complement each other. 
In several West European capitals, however, 
there are growing doubts as to whether the 
Belt and Road Initiative as promulgated 
by China will be equally profitable for all 
sides. Instead, suspicions are that the Initia-
tive is a Chinese geostrategic project. For 
Georgia, this means that the extent to 
which its two foreign-policy orientations 
can be reconciled will only be proved in 
practice. 
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